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The Intellectual Standard 
On Man 
Jaret I<:anarek, Editor-in-chief 
There is an all-pervasive assault, especially in schools, on "gen­
dered" language. Increasingly, it is not acceptable to say he1 or she, him 
or her, et cetera.2 These terms are seen as exclusionary to any and every 
unspecified party. Instead, students are required to say one, person, slhe or 
some other non-specific, arbitrary, "gender-neutral" term. The epicenter of 
the assault, posited as the pinnacle of linguistic evil, is the term man. Man, 
the assailants say, only denotes males. Females are the excluded party, and 
thus the use of the term is sexist.3 The solution, then, is to reject the use of 
the term for some "substitute:'4 
Unfortunately for the assailants, there is no substitute, neither 
metaphysically nor linguistically. Just as man is unparalleled in cognitive 
measure, so is the term that describes him. Man, by definition, is "a rational 
animaI:'5 To say that man only denotes males is to say that being a female 
violates the definition; whether females are not animals, not rational, or 
neither is for the assailants to specify. The term's linguistic referents are all 
men - past, present, and future - each as an individual, though not limited 
to any particular one. 
The suggested "substitutes" for man do not and cannot achieve 
such a meaning. They are conceptually limited and through the filter of 
gender neutrality, most are laughable. Take, for example, the term human 
1 Italics will be used to designate a term being used, referenced, or defined. 
2 See "Beyond the 'HeiMan' Approach: The Case for Nonsexist Language" by 
Wendy Martyna, a professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa 
Cruz. 
3 See "Why Sexist Language Matters" by Sherryl Kleinman, a professor of Sociol 
ogy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
4 See, for example, the nonsexist writing guidelines by the National Council of 
Teachers of English, The American Philosophical Association, The British Soci 
ology Association, and Hamilton College's writing center, which includes a 
works cited containing many more examples. 
5 This definition originated in Aristotle's Metaphyiscs, and has since been the clas 
sic definition in philosophy. A broader context of this definition is given by 
Ayn Rand in Introduction to the Objectivist Epistemology, where she writes, 
"[The] valid definition of man, within the context of his knowledge and of all of 
mankind's knowledge to-date [is]: 'A rational anima!:" 
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and its plural form, humans. Conceptually, the former only refers to a sin­
gle' particular, concrete of one man. John can be called a human, as can 
Susan and David, but the term, used properly, can only denote one at a 
time. Singular terms falter quite substantially in that they are conceptually 
limited to a single entity. Alternatively, humans refers to John, Susan, and 
David as a specified group, but also each as individuals and, by definition, 
includes all men. Humans, then, could be a substitute for man; however, 
it cannot pass the filter of gender neutrality. It is near impossible, even for 
the assailants, to ignore the fact that the root of the term human is, in fact, 
man. Any reason why man is bad logically pertains to any term wholly 
encompassing it. 
It should be clear, then, why mankind, and its corrollary human­
kind, are not viable substitutes, at least through the filter of gender neutral­
ity. In terms of meaning, they face severe conceptual limitations in that 
they only refer to a collective whole, and cannot refer to any individuals 
comprising the collective. It would be incorrect, for example, to say that 
John, Susan, and David are mankind (or humankind). Homo sapiens, which 
refers to the entire species of man, has this limitation as well. 
Person faces the limitation of only referring to a single, particular, 
concrete of one man. Its plural, people (seemingly the favorite substitute of 
the assailants), is limited in that it only refers to a collective of men. In fact, 
the origin of the term is the Latin populous (or populace), which is, by defi­
nition' only a collective. Man, as stated earlier, refers to all men, each as an 
individual, though not limited to a particular one. By contrast, people does 
not have to mean all men, but can be only some specified number of men. 6 
Its subject is the specified collective and not the individuals comprising it. 
To demonstrate this point, take, for example, the sentence "People 
are white:' which is grammatically correct and factually true. It is factually 
true because there are men who are white (a collective sum), even though 
not all individual men are white. The sentence "Man is white:' is grammati­
cally correct, but is factually false. "Man is white" is factually false because 
6 It is important to note that the term man can be changed to men (its plural 
form) and subsumes the meaning of people. The reverse cannot happen in 
regards to people. A man could say "there are eight people:' but a man could not 
say, "there are eight man:' He would have to say, "there are eight men:' The exis 
tence of the term men denotes another reason why man is so unique and ap 
pears alone in its achieved conceptual meaning. 
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man refers to all men, each as an individual, and there are individual men 
who are not white. A conceptual difference occurs because people can refer 
to any collective of men, whether specified or unspecified, and does not 
have to be all men. 
Some men say that people is able to achieve the same meaning 
as man. This is true, only in certain contexts (when people is used in the 
utmost general, unspecified way, where people is intended to mean "all 
men").7 The sentences, "People are good. Some people are not:' require 
specification about which people are good (these people, some people, eight 
people, et cetera), because the context requires it. People could mean "all 
men" but, just as validly, be any other quantity of men. By contrast, "Man 
is good" cannot be followed by a sentence specifying its opposite about 
"some men:' In conceptual meaning, these two sentences would be in di­
reet contradiction with one another.8 If the sentences were written with a 
subsequent contradictory sentence the term man would be unfit for such 
use. The sentence could not read, "Man is good. Some men are not;' but 
would have to be, "Men are good. Some men are not:' Further specific­
ity about which men would be required; however, this is only because the 
term man is no longer in use. 
Notice that in this case men and people achieve the same mean­
ing, but man remains irreplaceable in conceptual meaning and content. 
Because of the context -dependent nature of people it cannot consistently 
have the same meaning as man. In light of the shortcomings associated 
with people, the term man fulfills a necessary linguistic role. In cases where 
people cannot be used to the same effect as man, the term man becomes a 
linguistic necessity.9 In summation, man denotes all men, each as an indi­
vidual, while people denotes only a specified collective of men. People does 
have one "redeeming" quality, though, in that it is impossible to know the 
gender of its referents. 
One final substitute is individual, and its plural, individuals. The 
conceptual limitations of the singular and plural need no further discus-
7 In most cases, people, in order to avoid confusion, must be presupposed with the 
use of the term all. 
8 Where man, properly defined, denotes all men each as an individual, but no 
single man specifically. 
9 It becomes a linguistic necessity because there is no other concept, if the goal is 
to speak about the referents of man, which can replace the term. 
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sion, nor does its obvious success as a gender-neutral term. However, the 
use of the term individualbegs the question: individual what? Specification 
is required for the reader to know exactly what the individual is. Regard­
ing the sentence, " The individuals John, Susan, and David are sitting in 
the backyard:' can you confidently say that the subjects are men and not 
dogs?lO Individual, as a term, cannot denote what the subject is, and thus 
cannot be considered a viable alterative to man. Where as individual speci­
fies a number of some entities, man specifies the nature of the entity. Thus, 
individual can modify man by specifying the quantity of men, but cannot 
be substituted for the term.11 
Evidently, the term man is linguistically unparalleled in that no 
other term is capable of its conceptual content. With the weeds finally 
wacked, it is necessary to unearth the assault on man at its root. In Old 
English, the term man was used to refer to 'human beings' in general, re­
gardless of sex. 12 At the time there were separate terms for "adult male" and 
"adult female:' but the term man eventually replaced the term for "adult 
male" all the while maintaining its original, definitional meaning. The ar­
gument against man as an old-fashioned and sexist term originated from 
the obfuscation of man's actual referents. Man, the assailants say, l3 not only 
excludes women but also posits them as inferior because the term woman 
is a modification of man. This is only under conditions in which objec­
tivity in definition is abdicated in favor of ascribing arbitrary referents to 
terms, i.e. ascribing "adult male" to the term man. In current use, it is, in 
fact, the use of the term woman that continues to delegate the definition 
of "adult male" to the term man. The real issue is not with man but with 
woman. If the assailants really cared about gendered language, they would 
have ceased their attacks on man and abandoned woman long ago. If the 
assailants really cared about language, they would have ceased their capri­
cious modification of definitions, realizing that they were trying to fix the 
problem with its cause. 
The attacks on man and the suggested "substitutes" are irrational. 
10 Contextual clues always help, such as the activity changing from "sitting in the 
backyard" to "doing calculus homework;' but the point remains the same. 
1 1  The same applies to other such substitutes, such as one. 
12 Information regarding the history of the term man comes from the New Oxford 
American Dictionary entry for "man". 
13 See footnotes 2, 3, and 4. 
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The fight for the term man is the antithesis. This fight is not a trivial one, 
for it is, in essence, the fight for reason, objectivity, and that which neces­
sitates them: man and the efficacy of his mind. In today 's prevalent culture 
of whim-worship, it is more important than ever to move past the tyranny 
of irrationality and into the joy of reason. This can be accomplished only 
when man is able to finally stand upright, hold his head high, and declare 
proudly, defiantly, and without guilt: " I  am man!" 
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